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RICHAiw W. FLouRioy, Ja.
Assistant Solicitor, Department of State
Pradier-Fodr6 in his learned work on Public International Law'
discussed with particular care and at considerable length the difficult
question of conflicts of nationality laws. After proposing certain
solutions and explaining the benefits to be derived therefrom, he con-
cluded by pointing out one crowning benefit, namely, that it would "end
"those interminable dissertations on the accumulation of nationalities."
My excuse for adding to these dissertations is the fact that, though a
third of a century has elapsed since Pradier-Fod6r6's book was pub-
lished, the problem of dual nationality remains unsolved, and very
little progress, if any, has been made toward a solution. So long as
in the laws of half of the countries of the world nationality continues
to be based primarily upon place of birth (jus soli), while in the laws
of the other half it is based primarily upon descent (jus sanguinis),
the problem will continue to exist, to the confusion of the individuals
concerned and the harassment of the foreign offices of the countries
whose protection they seek or whose demands they attempt to evade,
unless a solution is reached by international agreement. The problem
is not made simpler by the fact that most of the countries whose laws
of nationality are based upon jus soli have engrafted upon them, to a
greater or less extent, the rule of jus sanguinis, while many of the
countries holding to the latter rule have engrafted upon their laws,
in one way or another, rules deduced from jus soli. The object
of these countries seems to be simply to gather into their citizenship
the greatest possible number of persons, and, of course, this does not
12 Pradier-Fodbr6, Traiti de droit international public (1887).
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work for international harmony. In the following pages the nationality
laws of the various countries of the earth, and particularly our own
country, will be briefly reviewed. Special attention will be given to the
efforts which have been made to settle questions of dual nationality, by
legislative enactment or executive practice, and the possibility of a
general solution will be considered.
2
Of the two principles of nationality jus sanguinis is probably the
older. It seems that in ancient times the nation was viewed as a collec-
tion of tribes, more or less related, the tribes being made up of clans,
and the clans of families. Although nations usually came to occupy
well defined territories upon attaining civilization, they continued for a
long time to be regarded as a collection of tribes, clans, and families,
rather than as a single people subject to territorial jurisdiction. Under
such conditions it was natural that nationality should have little if
anything to do with place of birth. Roman citizenship seems to have
been originally of this nature.3
On the other hand jus soli seems to have originated with the feudal
system, under which all persons, with certain limited exceptio.u born
within the fief of an over-lord were held to owe fealty to him and alle-
giance to the sovereign.
Our own law of citizenship was derived from the -English common
law, in which jus soli, or the feudal principle, prevailed. Some years
ago Mr. Prentiss Webster published a book on citizenship, a great part
of which was devoted to an argument that American citizenship is not
based upon the feudal theory. While it may be truly said that it is
not based upon feudalism, the fact remains that feudalism was the seed
from which it sprang. The .seed decayed long ago, and the vine, so
to speak, has been transplanted from English to American soil, where,
for reasons which we shall note later, it has flourished and will no
doubt for many years continue to flourish.
ENGLISH LAW OF NATIONALITY
The leading English court decision on the question of citizenship by
birth is Calvin's Case,' which was tried ift the year i6o8 in the Exche-
qtfer Chamber before the Lord Chancellor and all of the Judgei of
England. This case is celebrated, not only for the importance of the
decision made, but also for the form of Lord Coke's report.. According
' This discussion relates only to native citizenship, and not to citizenship
acquired through naturalization. As the United States is committed to the
doctrine of the right of expatriation, the existence of dual nationality is not
admitted in cases of naturalization.
'-See Maine, Ancient Law (Pollock's ed. i9o6) ch. 5; Howe, Studies in the
Civil Law (i896) Lecture 2; i Westlake, International Law (2d ed. i9io) ch.
io; 2 Calvo, Droit internationale (5th ed. 1896) livre 8; Geouffre de Lapradelle,
De la nationaliti d'origine (1893) ch. I.
' (x6o8) Coke, pt. Vii; 1, 31.
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to the custom of the time, he did not quote verbatim the opinions of the
judges, but gave a digest of them in his own language." It appears
that Robert Calvin was born in Edinburgh in the third year of the reign
of James I as King of England and the thirty-ninth year of his reign
as King of Scotland. It was held that he had, by the fact of his birth
within the King's dominions, the status of a British subject in England,
and not merely the ,status of a subject of James as King of Scotland.
In his report Lord Coke made the following observations concerning
the nature of allegiance and the basis of nationality under the' common
law:
"Ligeance is the mutual bond and obligation between the King and
his subjects, whereby subjects are called his liege subjects, because they
are bound to obey and serve him; and he is called their liege lord,
because he should maintain and defend them. Whereby it appeareth,
that in this point the law of England and of Scotland is all one. There-
fore it is truely said that protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio
protectionen" (5a).
"They that are born under the obedience, power, faith, ligealty, or
ligeance of the King, are natural subjects, and no aliens" (5b).
"Calvin the plaintiff being born under one ligeance to one King,
"'This case," says Coke,
"was as elaborately, substantially, and judicially argued by the Lord Chancellor,
and by my brethren the Judges, as I ever read or heard of any; and so in mine
opinion the weight and consequence of the cause, both in praesenti et perpetuis
futuris temporibus justly deserved: for though it was one of the shortest -and
least that ever we argued in this court, yet was it the longest and weightiest that
ever was argued in any court, the shortest in syllables, the longest in substance;
the least for value (and yet not tending to the right of that" least) but the
weightiest for the-consequent, both for the present, and for all posterity."
Because of the quaintness of the language and the beautiful view of the law
which it gives, I cannot refrain from quoting the following passage from this
same remarkable report:
"And in the arguments of those that argued for the plaintiff, I specially noted,
that albeit they spake according to their own heart, yet they spake not out of
their own head and invention: wherein they followed the counsel given in God's
book, interroga pristinam generationem (for out of the old fields must come the
new corn) et diligenter investiga patrum memoriain, and diligently search out
the judgments of our forefathers, and that for divers reasons: first on our own
part, Hesterni enim sumus et ignoramus, et vita nostra sicut umbra super terrain;
f6r we are but of yesterday, (and therefore had need of the wisdom of those that
were before us) and had been ignorant (if we had not received light and knowl-
edge from our forefathers) and our days upon the earth are but as a shadow,
in respect of the old ancient days and times 'past, wherein the laws have been by
the wisdom of the most excellent men, in many successions of ages, by long and
continual experience, (the trial of right and truth) fined and refined, which no
one man, (being of so short a time) albeit he had in his head the wisdom of
all the men in the world, in any one age could ever have effected or attained
unto. And therefore it is optima regula, qua nulla est verior aut firmior in Jure,
neminem oportet esse sapientiorcm legibus; no man ought to take upon him
to be wiser than the laws. Secondly, in respect of our forefathers: ipsi (saith
the text) docebunt te, et loquentur tibi, et ex corde suo proferent eloquia, ther
shall teach thee, and tell thee, and shall utter the words of their heart, without
all equivocation or mental reservation; they (I say) that cannot be daunted with
fear of any power above them, nor be dazzled with the applause of the popular
about them, nor fretted with any discontentment (the matter of opposition and
contradiction) within them, but shall speak the words of their heart, without all
affection or infection whatsoever."
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cannot be an alien born. . . Ligeance of the subjects of both king-doms, is due to their Sovereign by one law, and that is the law of
nature" (14 b).
"There be regularly (unless it be in special cases) three- incidents to'a subject born. i. That the parents be under the actual obedience ofthe King. 2. That the place of his birth be within the King's domin-ion. And, 3. The time of his birth is chiefly to be considered; for hecannot be a subject born of one kingdom that was born under theligeance of a King of another kingdom, albeit afterwards one kingdom
descend to the King of the other" (i8a).
Dicey evidently had the decision in Calvin's Case in mind when
he made the following analysis of the principle of jus soli in the law of
England:
"It is well to notice that allegiance, though it practically dependsupon the place of a person's birth, theoretically depends upon a person'sbeing born under the control and within the protection of a particularsovereign, and therefore only indirectly on the place of a person's birth.This consideration explains most of the exceptions to the rule that aperson born within British territory is a British subject."8
"By the" Common Law of England," says Cockburn,
"'every person born within the dominions of the Crown, no matterwhether .of English or of foreign parents, and, in the latter case,whether the parents were settled, or merely temporarily sojourning, inthe country, was an English subject; save only the children of foreignambassadors (who were excepted because their fathers carried theirown nationality with them), or a child born to a foreigner during thehostile occupation of any part of the territories of England. No effectappears to have been given to descent as a source of nationality."7
In this concise summing up of the English common law on nationality
I call special attention to the words, "whether the parents were settled,"or merely temporarily sojourning in this country," since they relate to
a point to which I shall advert later in discussing our own law of
nationality.
The last sentence in Cockburn's statement raises a question which has
been the subject of much discussion. A number of writers, some of
the highest authority, have disagreed with the opinion expressed by
Cockburn and have contended that the principle of jus sanguinis, as
well as that of jus soli, was contained in the common law of England.
This question has been a subject of controversy for six centuries or
more, and I shall not try to settle it in the present article.8 I The first
attempt in England to fix by statute the status of persons born abroad
of English parents was made in the reign of King Edward II. Con-
" Dicey, Conflict of Laws (2d ed. i9og) 166, n. 4
'Cockburn, Nationality (i869) 7."In his opinion in Lynch v. Clarke (1844, N. Y. Ch.) "I Sandf. 583, -Judge
Sandford mentioned such high legal authorities as Lord Bacon, Chief JusticeTindal, Baron Parke, and Chancellor Kent as holding that jus sanguinis was apart of the common law, but equally high authorities have held the contrary view.
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cerning this statutory enactment Cockburn gives the following
account :9
"It appears from the Parliamentary Rolls of the reign of Edward
III., that as early as the 17th of that king (1343), doubts having arisen
whether even the king's sons born without the realm could inherit, the
Archbishop of Canterbury brought the question before the Lords. The
Lords replied unanimously that there was no doubt that the king's
sons could inherit, wherever born, but that with regard to children of
other persons there were great difficulties in deciding the question.
The matter was again brought before the Lords and Commons jointly,
who concurred in the opinion previously given by the Lords, and recom-
mended that a law should be passed on the'subject; but, as Parliament
was about to be proiogued, 'et ceste besoigne demand grant avisement'et b6ne deliberation coment ele se purra mieltz faire, et plus surement,'
the further consideration of it was deferred. (Rotuli Parliamentorum,
vol. ii, p. 139. Appendix to Report of Commissioners, p. 6.)
"Owing to the plague, legislation on this and other subjects was not
resumed till the year 1350, when the Act 25 Edward III. stat. 2 was
passed, entitled 'A statute for those that be born* beyond sea.' By this
statute it is provided 'that all children inheritors which from henceforth
'shall be born without the legiance of the king, whose fathers and
'mothers at the time of the birth be and shall be at the faith and legiance
'of the King of England, shall have and enjoy the same benefits and
'advantages; to have and bear the inheritance within the same legiance,
'as other inheritors aforesaid in time to come; so always the mothers
'of such children do pass the sea by the license and wills of their hus-
'bands.'
"It has been said that this statute was only declaratory of the Coin-.
mon law. (See what is said by Lord Bacon when arguing as counsel
'in Calvin's case, 2 State .Trials, p. 585.) But this view is hardly
consistent with its language, which is prospective, and refers only to
children which 'from henceforth shall be born;' and it has been peirti-
nently observed that if the statute had only been declaratory of the
Common Law, the subsequent legislation on this subject would have
been wholly unnecessary."
.By the statute 7 Anne, c. 5- (1708), it was declared that "the children
"of all natural-born subjects" (not merely children inheritors) should
be deemed to be "natural-born subjects" of the Crown.
By the Act 4 George II, c. 21 (I'7I), it was provided that children
born abroad "whose fathers were or shall be natural-born subjects of
"the Crown of Englan.d, or of Great Britait" should -beconsidered
natural-born subjects of the Crown. According to this statute it
seems that British nationality was inherited through fathers only.
Under the two statutes just mentioned British nationality did not
descend beyond the first generation of those born abroad, but by the
statute of i 3 th George III, c. 2, (1773) it was extended to the second
generation. Finally the statutes mentioned were replaced by the
British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, the first section of
Part I of which provides that
' Cockburn, op. cit., at pp. 7, &
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"the following persons shall be deemed to be natural-born British
subjects, namely:
"(a) Any person born within His Majesty's dominions and alle-
giance; and
"(b) Any person born out of His Majesty's dominions, whose
father was a British subject at the time of that person's birth and either
was born within His Majesty's allegiance or was a person to whom a
certificate of naturalization had been granted; and
"(c) Any person born on board a British ship whether in foreign
territorial waters or not."
Section 14 of the Act last mentioned contains provisions under which
persons born in British dominions of alien fathers and persons born
abroad of British fathers may, upon reaching majority, renounce
British nationality by making a declaration of alienage. These provi-
sions had already appeared in the British Naturalization Act, i87o.
AMERICAN LAW OF NATIONALITY
I have spoken in some detail of the British law of nationality because
our own law of nationality was taken from it. While the Constitution
of the United States did not in its original form state what persons were
to be considered citizens of the United States, it did speak of "natural
"born citizens,"10 and the courts, when called upon to decide who were
natural born citizens, held that this term referred to the English com-
mon law and should be construed in accordance with it. As early as
the year 18o4 Chief Justice Marshall, in rendering the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of The Charming Betsy,1 had -assumed
that persons born in the United States were citizens of this country,
and in the case of Inglis v. Trustees of Stailor's Snug Harbor,12 Justice
Story, in the course of his opinion, said:
"Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the
children even of aliens born in a country, while the parents are resident
there under the protection of the government, and owing a temporary
allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth."
The whole subject of native citizenship was thoroughly reviewed by
Assistant Vice Chancellor Sandford in his admirable opinion in the
case of Lynch v. Clarke,3 decided in 1844. This opinion is notable
for its common sense and originality as well as for its unusual thorough-
ness and evidence of wide learning. Up to this time citizenship in the
United States had been regarded generally as pertaining primarily to
the individual states which had separately adopted the English common
law, but Judge Sandford treated citizenship as essentially national,
and thereby anticipated by more than two decades the declaration con-
"Article 2, section 4.
(i804. U. S.) 2 Cranch, 64.
(2830, U. S.) 3 Pet 99, i64.
Supra note &
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cerning citizenship contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. In the course of his opinion he said:
"The provisions of the Constitution of the United States demonstrate
that the right of citizenship, as distinguished from alienage, is a
natural right or condition, and does not pertain 'to the individual
states" (p. 641).
"Citizenship . . . is a political right, which stands not upon the
municipal law of any one state, but upon the more general principles of
national law" (p. 644).
"In my judgment there is no room for doubt, but that to a limited
extent, the common law, (or the principles of the common law, as some
prefer to express the doctrine,) prevails in the United States as. a sys-
tem of national jurisprudence" (p. 654).
"When the Union was formed and further state regulation on the
point terminated, it follows, in the absence of a declaration to the
contrary, that the principle which prevailed, and was the law on such
point in all the states, became immediately the governing principle and
rule of law thereon in the nation formed by such union" (p. 655)-
"It is indispensable that there should be some fixed, certain and
intelligible rules for determining the question of alienage or citizenship.
The place of nativity furnishes one as plain and certain, and as readily
to be proved, as any circumstance which can be mentioned" (p. 658).
judge Sandford goes on to observe that, because of the presence in
this country of alien immigrants in such large numbers, if jus sanguinis
should be recognized as the sole basis of nationality, this "might lead to
"the perpetuation of a race of aliens" (p. 673) .4
On April 9, I866, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act,
1 5 which
contained the following provisions:
"All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the
United States."
Two years later the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was
adopted, the first section of which provided that
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside."
As Mr. Van Dyne states, in his excellent and reliable book on Citizen-
ship of the United States,"8 "these two definitions, which are practically
"identical, are declaratory of the common law." In support of this
statement he quotes a number of decisions of courts, and in particular
the decision of the Circuit Court of the United States in the case of
Re Look Tin Sing,17 and the decision of the Supreme Court of the
" This decision was followed by Attorney General Black in an opinion ren-
dered July i8, 1859, 9 Op. Atty. Gen. 373.
i14 Stat, at L. 27.
(i9o4) at p. 7.
"(1884, C. C. D. Calif.) io Sawyer, 353, 21 Fed. 9o5.
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United States in the case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 8 in both
of which it was held that a person born in the United States of Chinese
parents was a citizen of the United States. In these decisions much
reliance was placed upon the decision in Lynch v. Clarke. " The provi-
sions of the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment added
nothing to the existing law, except, perhaps, to make it clear that
persons born in the United States of African parents are citizens of this
country. It has been said that these provisions changed the funda-
mental law by making citizenship primarily a national, rather than a
state, relation, but, as we have observed, this principle had been
declared many years before by Assistant Vice Chancellor Sandford in
his notable decision in Lynch v. Clarke.
Notwithstanding the decisions of the courts mentioned and others
to the same effect, the law of this country concerning citizenship by
birth has been misstated by a number of writers on international law,
who have assumed that, in order that a person born in the United States
of alien parents may have American citizenship, his parents must have
been domiciled in this country at the time of his birth. This error
seems to have originated with Wharton, who seems to have gone so far
as to hold that persons born in the United States of alien parents were
not citizens of the United 'States, under the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act, since their parents were "subject to a foreign power."
He seems to have fallen into the error of construing these words as
equivalent to "subjects of a foreign power." He cites -several declara-
tions of Secretaries of State in support of his opinion,'1 but these
declarations are not in accord with the decisions of the courts. Mr.
Hannis Taylor, relying partly upon Wharton, expresses his opinion that
"children born in the United States to foreigners here on transient
"residence are not citizens, because by the law of nations they were not
"at the time of their birth 'subject to the jurisdiction,' "20 and Wharton's
opinion has also been followed by such careful and reliable authors
as Hall21 and Westlake.22 I should hesitate to question the view
expressed by such high authorities were it not for the fact that 'it is
clearly contrary to the decisions of our courts. It is true that the
decisions in Re Look Tin Sing and United States v. Wong Kim Ark did
not directly decide the precise point that persons born in the United
States of aliens who are mere sojourners or transients are citizens of
this country, since in each of these cases the parents were domiciled in
the United States, so that it was not at issue. However, both of those
' (1898) I69 U. S. 649, 18 Sup. Ct. 456.
19 3 Wharton, International Law Digest (1886) sec. 183.
'Taylor, International Law (1goi) 22o, sec. 178.
"Hall, International Law "(5th ed. a9o4) 225.
"Westlake, International Law (19o4) 226-7. See also to the same effect the
decisions of Thornton, Umpire in Arbitration, July 4, 1868, in the claims of
Snares v'. Mexico and del Barco & de Garate v. Mexico [3 Moore, International
Arbitrations (1898) 2449].
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decisions relied to a considerable extent upon the decision in Lynch v.
Clarke, in' which the person concerned, who was declared to be a native
citizen of the United States, was born in this country of alien .parents
who were mere sojourners. What is more important, all of these
decisions were based upon the theory that the law of citizenship of the
United States was taken from the common law of England, and the
latter makes no distinction between persofns born in the country of
alien sojourners and those born of domiciled aliens.
2 3
"But," one may ask, "if a Chinese merchant and his wife are return-
"ing from Europe to China via the United States, and a child is born to
"the woman in San Francisco the day before they sail, is such child, by
"the mere accident of having first seen the light in this country, a citizen
"of the United States ?" Absurd as it may seem, the child is indeed a
citizen of the United States under the law of this country, although it
is also a Chinese citizen under the law of China. Although it is unfor-
tunate that such cases are possible, there is, on the other hand, much
practical advantage in a system in which mere proof of birth in the
United States is sufficient proof of citizenship. This is remarked upon
by Judge Sandford in the opinion to which I have called attention.
So much for citizenship through birth in the United States, under
jus soli, which is the basic principle of our law of nationality. Early
in the history of our country, that is, in the year i79o, a statute was
passed by which the principle of jus sanguinis was added. Under
this statute children born abroad of American parents were to "be
"considered as natural born citizens." 2' This statute was replaced in
1795 by another statute25 similar in effect, but with the words "natural
"born" omitted. For some inconceivable reason; or no reason at all,
Congress tinkered with this law again in 18o2 and passed an Act28
declaring that persons born abroad should be considered citizens of the
United States if they were the children of persons "who now are, or
"have been; citizens of the United States." In an article on The
Alienigenae of the United States, published in 1854 and attributed to
Horace Binney,2 7 attention 3vas called to the fact that persons born
abroad of citizens of the United States subsequent to the passage of the
Act of 18o2 could not, under the provisions thereof, be considered
citizens of this country. In this article Mr. Binney. took the view that
jus sanguinis was not a part of the common law of England and hence
not a part of the common law of this country. To fill this hiatus Con-
gress in 1855 passed a new Act, which reads as follows:
"All children heretofore born or hereafter born out of the limits
and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers Were or may be
= Cockburn, op. cit. note 7 ; Hall, op. cit., at p. 227.
i Stat at L. io4, ch. 3.
I Stat at L. 415, ch. 2o, sec. 3.
=2 Stat at L. 155, ch. 28, sec. 4.
' (1854) 2 Am. L. REG. j93.
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at the time of their birth citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of
the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to
children whose fathers never resided in the United States.
' 28
It will be observed that a new principle was introduced by the Act of
1855, namely that citizenship should not descend beyond the first gener-
ation born abroad, a wise provision.- It is still argued by some persons
that Jus sanguinis is a part of the common law of England, and conse-
quently of the United States, so that the Act of 1855 was merely declara-
tory, except for the provision last mentioned; but evidently Congress
did not hold this view when it passed the Act.
On March 2, 19o7, Congress, acting upon the recommendations of a
board appointed by the Secretary of State, passed the now well known
Expatriation Act,2 9 the sixth section of which bears upon the status of
persons born abroad of American fathers. This provision will be
discussed further on, with relation to the question of election of nation-
ality.
NATIONALITY LAWS OF OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES
We shall now discuss briefly the nationality laws of other foreign
countries so far as they relate to nationality acquired at birth.
There is no country in which native citizenship is based solely upon
the principle of js soli, although in Portugal and most of the Latin
American countries it seems to be based primarily upon that principle.
However, the laws of all of these countries contain provisions under
which citiz-enship is extended, under certain conditions, to persons born
abroad of their citizens.
Under the Civil Code of Portugal persons born in that country are
Portuguese citizens, but those bo-n of alien fathers are given the privi-
lege of electing the nationality of their fathers.
Under the laws of the following countries citizenship thereof is
acquired first, by birth in their territories, and second, by birth abroad
of their citizens, provided in the latter case the persons concerned
become domiciled in the respective countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras; Panama,
Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. The law of Columbia is similar,
except that children born in that country of alien parents are not citizen!
thereof unless their parents are domiciled in the country. A provision
practically identical with the latter is found in the law of Nicaragua,
which also provides that persons born abroad of Nicaraguan parents
have Nicaraguan nationality if they make an election thereof. Under
the law of Peru persons born therein- have Peruvian nationality; like-
wise those born abroad of Peruvian parents, provided their names are
entered in the Civil Registry of Peru by their parents during their
minority or by themselves upon reaching their majority.
'U. S. Rev. St. 1873, sec. 1993.
"34 Stat. at 1. 1za8.
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In Spain under the Constitution and Article 17 of the Civil Code the
following are Spaniards: (I) persons born in Spanish territory, and
(2) children of a Spanish father or mother, although born out of Spain,
but the first provision is qualified as follows by Articles i and 19 of the
Civil Code:
"i. Children, while they remain under.the parental power (patria
potestad), have the nationality of their parents."In order that those born of foreign parents in Spanish territory
may enjoy the benefits granted to them by No. i of Art. 17 it shall be
an indispensable requisite that the parents declare, in the manner and
before the officials specified in Art. 19, that they choose, in the name of
their children, Spanish nationality, renouncing any other.
"19. Children of a foreigner born in Spanish dominion should
declare, within the year following their majority or emancipation, if
they desire to enjoy the quality of Spaniards which Art. 17 concedes
to them."
In Siam jus soli and jus sanguinis are given equal weight. Under
a law of April 10, 1913, Siamese nationality is granted unconditionally
first, to every person born of a Siamese father, and second, to every
person born in Siamese territory.
In the following, countries nationality seems to be based solely on
jus sanguinis: Austria, Hungary, Germany, Norway, Russia, Rou-
mania, Serbia, China, and Japan. But under a Japanese law of March
15, 1916, a Japanese person born in a foreign country, who is'a citizen
thereof under its law, may renounce Japanese nationality with the
consent of the Minister for Home Affairs. One under age must
obtain the consent of his legal representative. In the law of Salvador,
while citizenship is based upon jus sanguinis, there is a special provision
under which a child born in Salvador of a foreign father and a Salva-
doreon mother is Salvadorean unless he elects the nationality of his
father at majority.
In France, Denmark; and -Belgium, while nationality may be said
to be based primarily on jus sanguinis, the principle of jus soli is recog-
nized, with limitations. The French law of nationality was formerly
based upon jus soli,30 but provisions based upon jus sanguinis were
introduced in the latter part of the I8th century, and finally, by the
Civil Code of i8o4, the principle of jus sanguinis was adopted exclu-
sively. Experience showed, however, that the pendulum, had swung
too far. The large numbers of persons born in France of alien parents
and continuing to reside there, without French nationality and its
"Et Pothier (1699-1772), faisant directement allusion aux enfants qui nais-
sent en France, fait observer que 'on ne consid&re pas s'ils sont n6s de parents
frangais ou de parents 6trangers,' et m~me 'si les 6trangers sont domicili6s dans
le royaume on s'ils n'y sont que passagers; la seule naissance dans le royaume
donne les droits de naturalit6 ind~pendamment de l'origine du pare et de la mre
et de leur demeure (2).' L'homme appartenait i la terre, A la gl~be." 2 Calvo,
Droit internatiotal, op. cit. note 3, at p. 28.
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accompanying obligations and with practically no nationality, were
found to be more and more embarrassing, and, beginning in the year
185, several statutes were enacted to meet this situation. They were
necessarily based upon jus soli. " The experience of France proves that
it is practically impossible for any country in which there is a large
alien population to have its law -of nationality based solely upon the
rule of descent.
Under the Law of Nationality of June 26, 1889,1 French nationality
is extended to every person born in France of a foreigner and who at
the time of attaining his majority is domiciled in France, unless during
the following year he declines French nationality and proves that he
has preserved the nationality of his parents by a certificate of his
government. Under Article 9" of this law every person born in France
of a foreigner and who is not domiciled there at the time of attaining
his majority may, up to the age of twenty-two years completed, makes
his application to establish his domicil in France, and if he establishes
it there within a year after filing his application, he may claim French
nationality by means of a declaration which shall be filed in the Ministry
of Justice. Under paragraph 3 of Article 8, as amended by a law of
July 22, 1893, a person born in France of foreign parents, of whom one
was also born there, is a Frenchman, except that he has the privilege, if
it was his mother who was born there, of declining French nationality
within the year following the attainment of his majority. I shall
advert later on to these provisions of the French law -for election of
nationality.
The second paragraph of the Danish law of nationality of March i,
1898, contains a provision similar to that of the fourth paragraph of
Article 8 of the French law, except that the age of majority for* this
purpose is nineteen years completed and the election of foreign nation-
ality must be made within the last year.
Under Article 7 of the Belgian Law of Nationality of June 8, i9o9,
the following become Belgian at the expiration of their 22nd year if
during that year they have had their domicil in Belgium and have not
declared their intention of retaining their foreign nationality:
(i) A child born in Belgium of foreign parents one of whom was
himself born there or has been domiciled there for ten years continu-
ously;
(2) A child born in Belgium of a foreigner and who has been
domiciled in the Kingdom for the last six years continuously.
Section 2 of the Swedish Law of Nationality of Oct. i, 1894, closely
resembles the fourth paragraph of Article 8 of the French law. Under
this section a person born in Sweden of foreign parents, and domiciled
three until he attains the age of 22 years, becomes a Swedish citizen
unless, during the year previous he makes a formal election of the
nationality of his parents.
"Art. 8, par. 4.
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Under the law of Italy, as under the laws of the countries last men-
tioned, nationality is based primarily upon jus sanguinis: However,
Article 3 of the Italian law of June 13, 1912 provides that an alien born.
in the Kingdom or born of parents resident therein for IO years prior
to the time of his birth becomes an Italian citizen-(i) if he performs
military service in the Kingdom or accepts government employment;
(2) if, being resident in the Kingdom on the completion of his twenty-
first year, he declares within his twenty-second year that he adopts
Italian, nationality; or (3) if, having resided in the Kingdom for at
least ten years he does not declare within the time limit specified in
(2) that he desires to retain his non-Italian nationality.
The nationality law of Bulgaria of I9O3 is modeled after the French
law of x889, and resembles it very closely.
In Greece, while nationality is based principally upon descent, there
is a provision in Article 19 of the Civil Code under which persons born
in Greece of alien parents may acquire Greek nationality within the
year following the attainment of majority by declaring before the
municipal authority of their domicil their intention to establish them-
selves in the country and taking. the oath of citizenship before the
prefect.
In Switzerland citizenship depends upon the laws of the various
cantons, but the latter are limited by federal law. Formerly Swiss
citizenship depended entirely upon descent, but by a federal statute
of June 25, I9O3, the cantons were authorized to provide by -law for
acquisition of Swiss citizenship at birth, if (i) the mother was of Swiss
origin; or (2) the parents had been domiciled in Switzerland five years
at the time of the child's birth, butin either case the person concerned
should have the right of election. The experience of Switzerland with
regard to nationality laws seems to have been similar to that of France,
jus sanguinis alone having proved to.be unsatisfactory.32
' The federal Council of Switzerland has recently proposed to the Assembly
an amendment of Article 44 of the Constitution, under which it will be possible
for the Assembly -to pass a law granting Swiss citizenship directly,-without can-
tonal action, to children of domiciled aliens. Article 44, as amended, is to contain
the following provisions:
"The federal legislation will rule on the conditions of the acquisition or loss
of Swiss citizenship.". ..
"The federal Assembly can introduce the acquisition of Swiss citizenship by
incorporation. It can decide in particular that a child of foreign parents domi-
ciled in Switzerland at the time of its birth is a Swiss citizen by incorporation,
if his mother is of Swiss origin or if either his father or mother were born in
Switzerland. The child thus incorporated obtains from the time of his birth
the citizenship of that community where his parents at the time of his birth
were domiciled."
The proposed amendment will have to be approved by both chambers of the
federal Assembly, and then by a vote of the people. The federal Council has
also proposed a federal statute to carry out the provisions of the amendment
just quoted. It contains a provision to the effect that persons of the classes
referred to shall not be permitted to elect the nationality of their parents.
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The law of nationality of Persia contains a mixture of jus soli and
jus sanguinis. All persons born in Persia of Persian parents or of a
Persian mother are Persians. Also children born in Persia of alien
fathers are aliens, but they have the right to reclaim Persian nationality:
at majority, which, under Musulman law, is the age of sixteen.
In the law of Haiti citizenship is -based primarily upon descent, but
there is a special provision under which a person born in Haiti of an
alien father has Haitien nationality, provided his father is an African.
Article 3o of the Mexican Constitution of February 5, 1917, contains
the following provision:
"Mexicans by birth are -those born of Mexican parents, within or
without the Republic, provided in the latter, case the parents be also
Mexicans by birth. Those born within the Republic of foreign paren-
tage shall likewise be considered Mexicans by birth, who within one
year after they come of age shall declare to the Department of Foreign
Affairs that they elect Mexican citizenship, and who shall furthermore
prove to the said Department that they have resided within the country
during the last six years immediately prior to the said declaration."
The principal provisions of the Cuban law concerning native citizen-
ship are found in the first and second sections of Article 5 of the
Constitution, which state that native Cubans are:
"First. Those born of Cuban parents within or without the territory
of the Republic;
"Second. Those born within the territory of the Republic of foreign
parents, provided that on becoming of age they claim the right of
inscription as Cubans in the proper register."
The provisions of the Costa Rican law concerning, native citizenship
are quite strict. The principal provisions are found in sections 1, 2,
and 3 of Article 5 of the Constitution, which state that the following are
native Costa Ricans:
I. All persons born in the territory of the Republic, except those
who, being the issue of a foreign father or mother, should, under the
law, be clothed with fqreign nationality of the latter."2. The children of a Costa Rican father or mother, born outside
the ,territory of the Republic, whose names have been inscribed in the
civil register, by their parents during their minority, or by themselves
after reaching full age.
"t3. The children of a foreign father or mother born in the territory
of the Republic who, after having reached the age of twenty-one years,
register themselves as Costa Ridans, or were registered as such by their
parents before reaching that age."
As the laws of most countries extend their nationality to persons
born. abroad to their citizens it is obvious that most persons born in
Costa Rica of alien parents are not Costa Ricans unless they make the
express election provided in section 3. As a similar election is
required of persons born abroad of Costa Ricans, it seems probable
that there are comparatively - few native Costa Ricans except those
born in Costa Rica of Costa Rican parents.
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Under the Netherlands law of December 12, 1892, native citizenship
is based primarily upon jus sanguinis, but Article 2 provides that the
following is likewise a Netherlander:
"The child of a resident who, whether father or mother, according to
the distinctions made in Article I, was born himself or herself of a
mother residing in the Kingdom, unless it is ascertained that the child,
as a foreigner, belongs to some other country."
RECOGNITION BY SECRETARIES OF STATE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ELECTION
From the above review of the nationality laws of foreign countries03
it will have been observed that a number of them contain provisions for
election of nationality, at majority, by persons born with dual nation-
ality, but that these provisions are widely divergent. As a result of
this divergence it frequently, if not usually, happens that an election
duly made under the law of one country is not recognized under the law
of the other interested country. Thus these provisions are well nigh
useless so far as the settlement of conflicting claims to allegiance is
concerned. Our own country has been more backward than any other
country of importance in the effort to provide by statute a way of
settling cases of dual nationality. No effort whatsoever was made until
the passage of the Citizenship Act of March 2, 19o7, the 6th section of
which contains a provision concerning presons born abroad of American
citizens. This provision, as we shall see later, is of doubtful meaning
and questionable effect. However, the executive branch of the govern-
ment has for many years recognized and applied the principle of election
in connection with the issuance of passports or the extension of protec-
tion to persons residing abroad, who were born abroad of American
parents or were born in this country, of alien parents.
It is said that the doctrine of election originated with the French Civil
Code. I am unable to state when it was first recognized and applied
by the Department of State. Professor Moore cites3' a letter of Sep-
tember, 1o, 1867, from Secretary Seward to a Mr. Vantossel, who was
born in Chile of an American father, in which he said:
"Until you make your election -to reside in this country, it is not in
the power of this Government to protect you against the enforcement
of any obligations you may be under as a citizen of Chile."
It seems altogether likely that the statement of Secretary Seward just
quoted was not the first recognition by the Department of State of the
principle of election. The courts had long before the date of the
"My information concerning nationality laws, except those of the United
States, Great Britain, and France, and laws of other countries passed since I9o9,
was obtained principally from the Citizenship Board Report of r9o6 (H. R. Doc.
326, 59th Cong., 2d sess.) and Ernest Lehr, La nationallti dan les principaux
itats da globe (igog).
"43 Moore, International Law Digest (i9o6) 526. This book will be cited as
"Moore."
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lettfer just mentioned recognized the principle of election, although the
extent to which it may be regarded as actually a part of the law of this
country is, as we shall see, still somewhat doubtful.
As to the proper time for election, Secretary Bayard, in an instruction
of July 24, 1886, to the Charge d' Affaires at Vienna, concerning the
case of one Friedrich de Bourry, who was born in the United Sftates of
Austrian parents and went in early childhood to Austria to reside, said
"An election in a case of dual or doubtful allegiance.. . . must be
made on attaining majority, .or shortly afterwards, and must be signi-
fied by acts plainly expressive of intention, such as immediate prepara-
tions to return to the elected country."'5
About three years had elapsed since de Bourry had attained his
majority, and Secretary Bayard said:
"In the present case there is no evidence that an election to become
a citizen of the United States was ever made or intended, but on the
contrary all the facts create the presumption that an Austrian domicil
was chosen."
Professor Moore cites a number of other cases in which failure on the
part of a person residing abroad to make a proper election within three
or four years after the attainment of majority was held to have resulted
in a loss of the right to the protection of this government.3 6
There seems to be a current belief that citizenship acquired by birth
in the United States has a peculiar virtue, which does not exist in citi-
zenship acquired under jus sanguinis, but the Department of State has
been quite as strict in applying the principle of election-in the one class
of cases as in the other.
In an instruction of December - 3, 1878, to the MinIster at Paris
concerning one Henry Tirel, who was born in Philadelphia September
28, 1857, of French parents and desired an American passport to enable
him to escape military service in France, Acting Secretary of State
Seward said:
"Mr. Tirel is not, under the facts and circumstances stated in your
despatch, entitled to a passport or to any protection from this Govern-
ment against such obligations as the laws of France may impose on
him. Having attained his majority, the effect of his declared intention
not to return to the United States works a voluntary act of expatriation.
Should he hereafter change that intention and come to the United States
and there remain subject to its jurisdiction, his claims of citizenship
under the Constitution and the laws of the Republic will then receive
due consideration.
3 7
In 1895 Acting Secretary Adee approved the action of the Minister
at Vienna in refusing to intervene in behalf of one ]Edward Kovacsy,
who was born in the United States of Hungarian parents and was at
'For. Rel. 1886, 12; 3 Moore, 547.
33 Moore, 549-551. See also I For. ReL. 19o6, 657, and 2 id. 118o.
37 20 MSS. Instructions to France, 7.
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the time when the Minister's decision was made, twenty-one years of
age. His case, however, was aggravated by the fact that he admitted
that he had no intention of coming to the United States to reside
3 8
In stating the grounds of his refusal, the Minister laid special stress
upon domicil as the decisive point in election. He said that he would
accept nothing less than "an actual renouncement of the domicil so
"long maintained in Hungary and a return to the United States in good
"faith to make it his permanent home." As we have seen, Secretary
Bayard emphasized this same point in the case of de Bourry, mentioned
above, and it has always been recognized by the Department of State
as an indispensable element of election, indeed the basic and" decisive
element. A mere declaration of election is of itself of little or no value.
The person making the election must prove his good faith by actually
abandoning his foreign domicil and coming to the United States, to
reside and fulfill the obligations of citizenship, or must show that he has
a definite intention of doing so in the immediate or near future. The
rule was succinctly stated by Secretary Bayard in a note of April Io,
1888, to the Danish Minister at Washington, in which he said:
"A child born abroad of American parents, or in the United States
of foreign parents, although subject to the parental domicil during
minority, has, on becoming sui juris, the right of election of citizen-
ship; and, in the event of choosing American nationality, 'the best proof
of such election is to be furnished by continued residence in the United
States, or by return hither, if abroad, and the discharge of the duties
and obligations of the elected citizenship."3 9
Secretary Olney, in a letter of December 27, 1895, to one Ory, who
was born in Cuba of a naturalized American father of Cuban origin,
and who had continued to reside in Cuba for some years after attaining
his majority, said:
"Admitting, however, that your father was a- citizen of the United
States at the date of your birth, you and your brothers, in order to
conserve your American citizenship, should, on reaching your majority,
have come to the United States to reside. You are no longer 'children.'
Your citizenship is no longer derivative, but a matter of personal elec-
tion. You did not come to the United States on attaining your majority,
nor do you now express any intention of ever coming to this country to
reside. You are therefore, in.the Department's opinion, clearly not
entitled to claim the protection of this Government."4
The rule concerning change of residence has been reiterated by the
Department of. State in many cases, too numerous to mention.
41
Before the passage of the Citizenship Act of March 2, 1907, no
special formality was required in an election, The Department consid-
Mr. Adee to Mr. Tripp, July 23, 1895, 1 For. Rel. I895, 20, 3 Moore, 549-550.
i For. Rel. i888, 489; 3 Moore, 548.
3 Moore, 55o.
' See cases cited in 3 Moore, secs. 43o, 514, and Van Dyne, op. cit. note i8, chs.
1, 2, Part L
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ered deeds rather than words as decisive. In the oft cited case of
Robert Emden, who was born in Switzerland of an American father,
Acting Secretary? of State Porter said that election "requires no formal
"act, but may be inferred from the conduct of the party from whom
"the election is required." 2 It is true that Secretary Bayard, in an
instruction of July 2, 1886, to Mr. Vignaud, Charg6 at Paris, said con-
cerning Victor Labroue, who was born in France of a naturalized
American father, that his election of American citizenship "must not
"only be formally and solemnly declared, but must be followed by his
"coming to and taking up his abode as soon as practicable in the United
"States."'4  In stating that the election must be "formally and solemnly
"declared," Mr. Bayard seems to have referred to the formality required
by the French law in the case of a person who is born in France of alien
parents and is still domiciled there when he attains his majority, but
wishes to elect the nationality of his parents, rather than French nation-
ality. He observed that "with the law of nations in this respect . . .
"coincides the law of France." However, he added that "by the law
"of nations, apart from any municipal legislation, he would be entitled,
"when of full age, to elect which of the two allegiances he will accept."
In deciding cases of dual nationality the Department of State does
not, as a rule, endeavor to ascertain whether the person concerned has
made an effectual election of the nationality of the country in which
.he resides and may be considered a citizen of such country under the
laws thereof. In some cases the Department of State has stated that the
person concerned should be deemed to have made a "practical election"
of the nationality of the country of domicil, or has used words of like
purport. Thus, in the case of one David Marks, who had repiained in
Guatemala, the land of his birth, for five years after attaining his
majority, Acting Secretary Adee said that he had "inferentially elected
"other nationality than that of the United States."4' 4 As a practical
matter, it would be impossible for the Department of State to undertake
to ascertain, in every case of dual nationality, the status of the person
concerned under the law of the other country, before deciding his
status with regard to the United States. There is much diversity, as
we have seen, in the laws of the various countries of the world concern-
ing conditions and methods of election, and, while this government
endeavors to observe as far as possible the just claims of foreign coun-
tries, it is obliged to ground its decisions as to the status of persons
with regard to the United States upon its own laws and precedents.
As to the effect of election, it is important to consider whether an
election once made is final, that is, in particular, whether an actual or
presumptive election of foreign nationality results in a loss of American
"Mr. Porter to Mr. Winchester, Sept. 14, 1885, For. Rel. I885, 81r, 3 Moore,
545.
For. ReL 1886, 303, Van Dyne, op. cit. note 18, at pp. 40, 41.
T Mr. Adee to Mr. Coombs, Sept. 15, i9o3, For. Rel. 1903, 595, 3 Moore, 55r.
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citizenship, or whether it results merely in a temporary loss of the
right to the protection of this government. There are a number of
pronouncements of Secretaries of State to the effect that such an elec-
tion actually results in a loss of American citizenship. Acting Secre-
tary Porter took this view in the case of Robert Emden.
45 He declared
of election in general that "when once made it is final," and with refer-
ence to the specific case he said:
"If, on the other hand, he made no such election, but by remaining
in Switzerland is to be inferred to have accepted Swiss natioiality, he
can not now obtain a passport as a citizen of the United States. If
this be the case, his proper course, should he desire to become a citizen
of the United States', is to come here in person and become naturalized."
Professor Moore quotes a memorandum of Doctor Francis Wharton
of the Department of State, dated May 4, 1885, in which he expressed
his opinion that an "election must be regarded as final." 46 However,
the decisions of the Department of State in cases involving election
seem to relate generally to the right to protection rather than to nation-
ality as a matter of strict law, for, as the Department has repeatedly
stated, the technical legal status of citizenship does not necessarily
carry with it the right to protection. Thus, Secretary Fish, in a letter
of October 3o, 1871, to Mr. Niles, observed that
"citizenship involves duties and obligations, as well as rights. The
correlative right of protection by the government may be waived or
lost by. long-continued avoidance and silent withdrawal from the per-
formance of the duties of citizenship as well as by open renunciation."'7
In these cases the Department of State, as a rule, did not decide that the
legal status of American citizenship was lost by an express or inferential
election of the foreign nationality. It merely passed over this question
as unnecessary to be decided. Whether or not the persons concerned
had lost their legal title to American citizenship, the Department held
that they had placed themselves in a position where they were not
equitably entitled to the protection .of this government. This distinc-
tion was brought out by Mr. Adee, then Acting Secretary of State, in
an instruction of April 28, 1893, to Mr. Combs, Minister to Japan, con-
cerning the case of one Alexander Powers, who was born in Russia
of an American father, was about twenty-one years of age, had never
been to the United States nor learned to speak the English language,
and desired to obtain a passport to enable him to return to Russia on
business. Mr. Adee said:
"Between the legal status of citizenship and the right to continued
protection during indefinitely prolonged sojourn abroad, the executive
Supra p. 56a
46 3 Moore, 522. In support of the view that election of foreign nationality
terminates American citizenship see also Mr. Seward to Mr. Foster, Aug. 13, i879,
For. Rel. 1879, 825; and dictum in Ludlam v. Ludlam (1863) 26 N. Y. 356.
" 9 i MSS. Dom. Let. 211, 3 Moore, 762.
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authority of the United States draws a clear distinction in exercising its
statutory discretion to issue passports as evidence of the right to protec-
tion. The relation of the citizen to the state being reciprocal, embracing
the duties of the individual, no less than his rights, the essential thing
to be determined is the good faith with which the obligations of citizen-
ship are fulfilled.
"The best evidence of the intention of the party to discharge the
duties of a good citizen is to make the United States his home; the
next best is to shape his plans so as to indicate a tolerable certainty of
his returning to the United States within a reasonable time. If the
declared intent to return be conspicuously negatived by the circum-
stances of sojourn abroad a passport may be withheld. '4 8
The Department of State has drawn a distinction between the cases
of persons who are born abroad of American parents and upon reaching
majority are residing in the country of their birth, and those of persons
who are residing in a third country. In an instruction of November
27, 1891, to the Minister to France concerning three persons who
were born in Cuba of a naturalized American father and went during
their minority to -France to reside, Secretary Blaine held that it was not
necessary for them to show that they had made an election of American
nationality within a year after attaining majority, since France was
not the country of their birth. He said that
"their cases, therefore, are to be determined on precisely the same foot-
ing as those of native citizens whose long domicil abroad and absence of
definite intention to return create a presumption of voluntary abandon-
ment of claim to protection."4 9
(To be concluded in May)
'For. Rel. x893, 4oi, 3 Moore, 931-932.
"22 MSS. Instructions to France, 255; 3 Moore, 945-946.
